loadingResearch Proposal:- ‘What Roles Do Non-State Actors Play in the Provision of Security in Ghana?’.
Research Aim
In a lot of developing countries, including Ghana, due to inability or unwillingness, formal state security systems are unable to meet the security needs of a majority of citizens, particularly the poor. Consequently, a lot of these poor people depend on non-state actors for their security needs, with both positive and negative effects. The aim of this study is therefore to investigate the role that non-state actors play in the provision of security in Ghana, and thus help contribute to thinking on security provision in the country.
Background
Security is an important condition for development, and states have traditionally provided it to citizens. However, an increasing phenomenon is the provision of security functions by private actors to states, private organizations and individuals. Security privatisation is, however, not a new phenomenon; it dates back to the early Greek, and Roman armies.1 Contemporary private security has two broad forms, one formalized and consisting of individuals and organizations structured along corporate lines and providing services independent of the state.2 The second form consists of non-state actors who provide security, usually to the poor and marginalized in developing countries who are unable to procure the services of commercial security. They include individual security provisioning, neighborhood watch committees and vigilantes among others.
The state- non-state taxonomy is preferred to the formal-informal taxonomy common in discourses on private security. This is because some non-state security arrangements are quite formal in organization; they are not ad hoc in character.3 Much of the literature on security privatization in Africa has tended to focus on the activities of private military and commercial private security companies, with little on the non-commercial, non-state 12
Holmqvist (2005) Gumedze (2007) 3
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private actors. Yet, in many developing countries, these systems are the primary providers of justice and security to the poor.
The existence of numerous non-state security and justice systems in most of the developing world suggests that formal systems are inaccessible to majority of ordinary people, or where they are accessible, they are not effective at delivering security and justice for various reasons. Some reasons attributed to the increasing use of private security, include the impact of globalization and the inability or unwillingness of some of these states, to provide security as a public good. In the broadest sense, security in much of Africa is about protection against local crime and of personal security, protection of land and property, access to justice and resolution of community disputes4. In many developing countries however, the lack of effective public security, and the use of private commercial security by those who can afford it, means that crime and insecurity invariably shift to poor locales. Also, most of the public and private security institutions in the developing world are urban focused, whilst a majority of the poor live in rural areas and are thus excluded from the benefits of policing. Thus, poor people tend to gravitate toward non-state systems of security and justice because they find the formal systems expensive, slow and difficult to access, with police and prosecutors often biased towards powerful elite interests. They are thus forced to depend on community based arrangements informal and non-state security systems that usually do not have any links to the state. Where links exist, they have been state-sponsored arrangements like the Hisbah in Kano.5 Overall, state actors tend to be more hostile to informal security systems than they are to informal justice systems, perceiving the former as undermining the monopoly of the use of force by the state.
Poor people, particularly in urban locales, often live on the margins of ‘illegality’ in society in terms of illegal acquisition of housing, non-payment of taxation, etc. Consequently, they are unable or unwilling to approach formal state institutions to seek security and justice to avoid drawing attention to themselves. They therefore tend to rely 4 DFID (2004) 5
Ibeanu & Momoh (2008)
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on informal systems. In Alexandria, Egypt for instance, about 68% of the city’s population live in squatter settlements built informally in violation of building regulations. This makes squatters vulnerable to police action and exploitation.6 Yet, whether living in ‘illegality’ or not, these people have security and justice needs too, and would thus resort to systems that, though not formally recognized, provide these services. These systems however are not all without their own flaws, they are sometimes plagued by local power imbalances, and when this is the case, some poor people do not seek redress there, resulting in disputes sometimes escalating into violence.7 There is therefore the need to examine the impacts of these other systems on security, justice and socio-economic development, especially in the developing world.
Case Study
Ghana is a relatively peaceful country in a turbulent West African sub-region. In recent years however, there has been an increase in the activities of non-state security groups, due in part to ineffectiveness of the formal state system, especially the police, and an increasing crime rate. This has led ordinary people to seek justice and security from non-state actors. Whilst the wealthy are able to afford the services of commercial private security companies, the poor and marginalized who form a majority of the population, are forced to seek security outside these systems. This has an effect on poverty, inequality and the socio-economic development of these communities. These alternative systems are largely recognized as legitimate actors in these communities, even if they do not always provide equitable access or demonstrate respect for the rights of all community members. This has led to two parallel security systems operating under the facade of a collective governance arrangement – the state system, which largely caters to the needs and interests of the elite and its network of cronies; and an informal sector, where those without access to the state structures retreat. There is thus the need for a closer examination of this development, instead of relegating much of these activities (particularly those dealing with security and safety) to the realm of criminality.
6 Anderson (2003) 7 World Bank (2004)
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Research Questions
The research will seek to answer the following questions:
a. Which organisations are officially mandated to provide security in the country, and what perceptions do ordinary Ghanaians have of these organisations?
b. To whom do the majority of Ghanaians (particularly the poor) turn to for security? c. Who or what are the non-state security actors in the country and where do they get their mandate from?
d. What activities or services do these non-state actors engage in or provide, and what is the impact of their activities on the poor in the country?
e. What are the benefits of their activities, and what threats do their activities pose?
Methodology
The proposed study will be conducted bearing in mind issues of costs, time and access to the target population. It will be carried out in three phases, using quantitative and qualitative methods to collect primary data.
? Phase One will involve an in-depth literature review to achieve a more detailed theoretical framework and definitions of variables that will influence questionnaire and interview designs and subsequent analyses.
? During Phase Two, primary and secondary data will be collected from various identified actors in Ghana. Primary data will be collected using interviews and questionnaires. These interviews and questionnaires will be administered in two towns, the capital Accra which is urban in characteristics, and Tamale, a semi-rural town in the northern part of the country, where there is a simmering conflict over chieftaincy. Secondary data sources will include books, journals, reports, statutes and archival information. The population for the study will include chiefs and traditional leaders in communities, the police and military personnel, employees of private security organizations, ‘land guards’, community/communal security providers, non-governmental organizations and selected members of the general population.
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? During Stage Three, the data generated and collected will be analyzed and interpreted to come out with the research findings.
Research Challenges
Some problems that could affect the research include a limited access to some organizations like the security agencies This can however be overcome by using ‘gatekeepers’ at these institutions. Having attended several courses and conferences with some officers from some of these institutions during my career in the Army, they will be contacted to facilitate access to these institutions. Another problem that could arise will be the transmission of inherent errors and biases of data collected from secondary sources. To resolve this, secondary data that will be used will be limited to official documents and research done by appropriately recognized bodies who would have likely taken the necessary precautions to reduce such errors and biases.
Provisional Timeline
Phase One and questionnaire design will be completed by the end of May 2008 and Phase Two will be conducted in June 2008. Phase Three and a first draft will be completed by the end of November 2008. This draft will be circulated to the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College, London for comments. The final working paper will be submitted to Global Consortium by the end of January 2010.
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